From the South point o1 view various combinations of factors as described in Part II could be studied starting with the more ambitious : high growth, low unemployment, egalitarian income distribution, non-conventional development styles, strong South-South cooperation, which would correspond to the maximum possible satisfaction of the human needs .
Introduction
In this paper I describe certain results that were obtained in the UNITAR project based on a model I have specified for studying the relationship between international terms of trade and domestic income distributions of the exporting countries within the South. In particular, I shall concentrate on those countries that have certain characteristics that distinguish the situation of the underdeveloped world today .
I shall discuss the implications of these results about the question of the transmiaeion o1
growth from the North to the South through international markets, both through trade and through aid. The results are of crucial importance to a proper discussion of the scenarios outlined in the two previous papers .
The description of these results are lengthy as these are new theoretical results, and especially, because they contradict some of the most established orthodox ways of thinking of the relevant international markets to transmit growth . In particular, I shall present a set of results that contradict the statement that the growth of the North is necessary or even at all favorable to the growth of the South, which is central to much thinking about the New International Ecnnomy Order. The results will be briefly contrasted in the paper, with other existing reuslts in the literature, for instance, the immiserizing growth literature (cf . Shagwati (1988 ) , which implies that in order to prevent the (possible) immiserizing effect of growth, the South should not attempt to grow more than the North.
Or, put in other words, that the more rapid growth o1 the North, may prevent whatis called immiserizing growth in the South. I shall also briefly discuss the relation o1 these results with the more orthodox StolperSamuelson factor price equalization theory .
There is an underlying line of thought that relates in some sense, to the d"Pendencia theory thinkers of Latin America (sometimes called atructuralimt m) starting from the work of R. Prebisch and others and also including the work of W . Arthur Lewis, that have questioned the validity of stateQate which may be broadly summarized as the 'New International Order for It°erybody's Gain' . However, the latter critiques do not present rigorous ro i7aalizations, or theorems . Therefore they cannot be contrasted in netail with the results of the neoclassical theorists, with gains from trade or factor price equalization theorems . We shall, by contrast, here pr esent rigorously treated results that follow a general equilibrium analys is of markets .
T awWe is in addition another line of questions that should be presented h a 71'e with respect to the orthodox Liberal arguments, which are at present 1 a2'gely accepted by both the academic and the International development c'~3'w4ftunities . Underlying this line is the question of the legitimacy of th e' use of scarce world resources and, moreover, the use of resources at a cheap price of a world basis . The question of the scarcity of II at Vral resources is now widely regarded more a question of success with m$n aglng and of market behaviour of the parties, than one of absolute 4)Q30' aical scarcity . The 'limits to growth' approach has now been rejected the Bariloche and Sussex approach have been very widely accepted with~e ct to this issue . But the question still remains of the pricing of ih e 8e very scarce resources and that is, of course, an important question . Zh 3 -a is especially so since some of the most important resources, such as°i l for geographical reasons and also for marketing reasons have given price equalization model in that : first, the production technology has fixed coefficients (this is not, in effect, a major difference) but, more impoz.t an tly, the two factors of production (capital and labour) are not inelm,stic but somewhat elastic in supply ; also, factors have different alas t 1 ci ties of supply in the two regions .
In the price factor equalYzat 1on model labour supply is constant ; in our model labour supply will depend 1 nstead on real wages, and, in the South, labour supply will be 100
In the North, labour is relatively more inelastic. The North is therefore represented by an economy closer to the orthodox Heckscher-Ohlin theory and the South by an economy closer to those studied by (but not identical with) R. Prebisch and W. A. Lewis . With respect to the other factor, capital, it is assumed to be in more elastic supply in the North than in the South, although, again, this is not crucial to the results obtained . Another important difference of our model with both HeckscherOhlin and Stolper-Samuelson is the determination of the demand and the structure o1 the international market relations.
It is assumed here that at the beginning of the reriod there is a target for exports, a policy which Is represented by a (fixed short run) amount of exports that it is planned to export . This target in both transmitted to the producers domestically as demand for their products (say by the government or by a board) and to the international market as export supply in the short run. Therefore, there is an export 'policy' at work here . This is represented in Figures la and lb .
In the short run there in as inelastic supply of exports which is planned at the beginning of the period denoted EB . An an example, in the case of coffee, the government of Brazil would plan at the beginning of the period a certain amount which it attempts to export ; it does so, for instance, because it has an arrangement with the US for a total amount of exports .
At the beginning of the period the Brazilian government (or agency in charge) communicates to the producers of coffee that it is going to buy from them a certain total amount of coffee and sell it to the United very a lfstic with respect to real wages . Therefore, labour supply will react e t rongly to changes In the real wage in the South. it will turn out that while the domestic total output supply of the basic good to upward sloping as a function of prices (see Figure 2) the domestic demand of the basic good (which is derived not only from wage income but also from income from profits in the manner described before)
will also be an increasing function of prices .
Under the conditions of high duality and very elastic labour supply the demand for basic goods across equilibrium strictly will be an increasing function of prices increasing relatively more an a function of prices than supply of basic goods .
Therefore, there is a part of the excess demand function for basic goods in this economy (that appears related to income effects across equilibria of the economy) which is backward bending (see Figure 2) . We should here distinguish the long run from the short run offer curves .
In the short run, with the export policy described here, there is always an inelastic supply of the goods being exported ; in the longer run the supply is elastic. If now we have (see Figure 2b ) an international demand for the basic good offered we can then determine the short run international price pB. This international price may differ from the domestic price (ps r pB)' The international price is determined by the intersection of the short run inelastic supply (of, say, coffee) with international demand (for coffee) . The domestic price is, instead, determined by domestic conditions such as elasticity of factors and technologies, but it is determined not only by production conditions but also by domestic demand conditions, through a general equilibrium approach . For instance, the price of soya domestically will not only be determined by the cost of the production of soya but also by the employment level and the real wages (therefore, the income distribution) . As soya is a close substitute at the production level for feijao (a domestically consumed bean in Brazil) then employment and real wages would affect the domestic consumption, and therefore the domestic demand for this good . If the domestic demand is lower, domestic prices are likely to be lower, even with the same production costs (or even a bit higher) . So the domestic price is not only linked with the cost of production but also with income distribution and the demand structure of the domestic economy. This is shown, in precise detail, in equations in Chichilnisky (1979) and Chichiluisky and Cole (1979) .
It is shown in Figure 2 below that as long as the international price is above the domestic price there will exist a quasi rent from exports (the shaded area in Figure 2 ) and thus an incentive for producers to increase exports (EB , moving along the downward sloping long run locus) . This eventually produces a solution at the international market that will equate domestic and international prices . (See Figure 2b , long run eqilibrium) . This is proven in (4) to have necessarily two effects . One is that increased exports will worsen the terms of trade for the South. The t-%xt point is to explore whether even though the price of the good expo 3-ti ed by the South decreases it still may not be the case that total reveaties from exports by the South increase . This, of course, would depez~, on relative elasticities of demand . If revenue would increase, then expo " led policies could in principle be favorable to basic needs provide" adequate income redistribution policies are undertaken in the South.
This
It hen, would support the point of view that the responsibility for bet t a i, distribution of income is almost purely domestic . The result shown in C.'k %L1chilnisky and Cole (1979) is therefore of interest . Under the conditio "I't s described : the total revenue of proceeds from exports by the South will glso necessarily decrease together with the change in the terms of trades , So if the growth of the North produces an increase in the demand for t he products of the South both the total proceeds from exports of the South will decrease and also the terms of trade will deteriorate ; furthermore both the domestic distribution and total consumption of basic goods with*_, n the South will decrease . The Z ._esuIta just discussed does not occur when labour supply is not very elasq:-is and when there is not a high level of dualism in production . Thus, the Z__esuit would not in general be obtained from an application of the mode X-of trade between two developed economics . In effect, in the model The argument presented for the usual factor price equalisation effect in the existing literature, is based on the assumption that as a country lowers its tariff and so (hopefully) increases exports, this 'pulls' the factor for which the South has a relative advantage and which has a positive impact, both on the distribution of wages and returns to capital .
In particular, it tends to equalize the returns to factors in the two regions considered when one of the regions is labour rich and has a relative advantage in production of labour intensive goods . The reason this does not occur in our model is that, because of the high level of duality and of the very high elasticity of labour supply, an attempt to step up output of the basic good domestically in shown to produce an increase in the demand for the basic good . An increase in the production of the basic good increases employment . But if wages are relatively close to a subsistence wage (not fixed, and in this sensethe model differs from Arthur Lewis's model where there is a fixed minimum wage because of infinite elasticity of labour supply) then as real wages change and employment increases (because of the high level of labour intensity of the production of this good) the new wage income goes into increased demand for the basic good . This increase in the domestic demand for the basic good to such that it may thwart an attempt to increase domestic excess supply available for export unless domestic consumption is controlled . Therefore, in order to have more output available for export in this setting it becomes necessary to curtail domestic consumption and that in why the factor price equalization results, in this cue, does not follow .
Perverse Effects of Aid
Having dicussed the reversal of terms of trade with export led policies and the possible negative effects of increase of growth in the North on the South, I will now describe more briefly certain results which again, show how the effect of international markets may be to thwart the in tended effects of a transfer from the North to the South of economic aid .
A two good, two region, and three income group model similar to the above in constructed to explore possible effects of aid on welfare. l This model is in effect a simplified version of the above model, but contains all the features necessary to show the main lines of the argument . One region, the North, has two income groups characterised by different endowments and proportions of consumption of the basic and the luxury or investment goods. We examine aid policies that result in real transfers from the high income group of the North to the South .
In one case, the transfer is of luxury of investment goods, which is shown to produce an increase of the market price of these goods with respect to the basic good leading to an increase welfare of the North and decrease the welfare of the South.
In a second case, the high income groups in the North transfers basic goods to the South. It is shown here that an increase in welfare of the South can only occur at the expense of a decrease in welfare of the low income group ir_ the North. Therefore, under the conditions specified by 1 See Chichilnisky, G. "Basic Goods, the Effect of Aid on New International Economic Order", to be published Journal of Development Economics, 1980, for a full description of these results .
the model, aid cannot be relied upon to equalize overall welfare ae there is necessarily a trade-off between more North-South equality and equality with the North . When aid is endorsed to pursue New International Economic
Order objectives, a close examination of international and domestic markets seems in order, so as to avoid the conditions studied here .
What both sets of results for aid and trade show is that income distribution policies, say with regard to basic needs, cannot divorce themselves from international market considerations and, especially, from the relationship of international markets with domestic markets . This is true even for small economies that in principle do not have an effect on world prices . This is not to say that trade and aid are necessarily deterious to the South, but that both must be considered as part of a wider development strategy, taking account especially of demestic structures . Both sets of results can either give a neo-classical solution (e .g . a solution that in more consistent with factor price equalization results) or not, depending crucially on certain parameters of the model that may be subject to policy .
Therefore, a negative outcome could sometimes be changed to a positive one.
For example, if an income redistribution policy (or a basic need policy)
would change a situation of very elastic labour supply (say, in Brazil) to more inelastic, and demand specifications, then the reversal of the terms of trade would not occur. In fact, the Samuelson-Stolpher factor price equalisation theorem is proven to occur within the present model .
The importance of the theoretical results is to indicate firstly, that under some conditions conventional policies with regard to international transfer simply may not work and second to identify the relevant parameters to examine if an export policy is to be successful or not . The implication to be drawn from this study for economic policy is the necessity of looking for the right combinations of these crucial parameters .
The parameters are : the structure of the demand, the priority that certain groups have on the claim of output, for instance, investment over consumption of basic goods (this refers then to the type of market adjustment which is sort of an institutional feature of the economy) the elasticity of labour supply and, finally, the dualism (which is closely related in the context of the UNITAR project with technological questions) .
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With the appropriate values and combinations of these parameters the results will give a positive value to export led policies ; with other combinations of these same parameters there will be negative results, some results that we have observed historically or that we fear may occur in the future . As part of the UNITAR project we are building several data based case studies (together with Lance Taylor) that we believe will confirm the type of effects where results similar to those described here are almost apologetically presented. In the UNITAR study, too, the a; :omnlous results were first observed in the result of the computer model, but because they appeared to confirs the empirically observed findings on terms of trade of (Diaz Alejandro and others) thus immediately prompted deeper theoretical investigation. In other global models, however regionally and sectorally disaggregated, these results simply could not arise. Thus from a methodological point of view the importance of this paper is a clear demonstration of the need to move from empirical evidence and issues to a clear theory and only then to move detailed computer analysis .
